Can business corporations be legally responsible for structural injustice? The social connection model in (legal) practice

Publication date

2025

Authors

Bziuk, BarbaraISNI 0000000506342826

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Advisors

Supervisors

Document Type

Article

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License

cc_by

Abstract

In May 2021, Royal Dutch Shell was ordered by the Hague District Court to significantly reduce its CO2 emissions. This ruling is unprecedented in that it attributes the responsibility for mitigating climate change directly to a specific corporate emitter. Shell neither directly causes climate change alone nor can alleviate it by itself; therefore, what grounds this responsibility attribution? I maintain that this question can be answered via Young’s social connection model of responsibility for justice. I defend two claims: First, I argue that the model explains Shell’s connection to climate change and that this relationship grounds Shell’s responsibility. Second, by identifying a way in which the social connection model could be applied to corporations in legal practice, I further develop Young’s model. I question Young’s distinction between political and legal responsibility for justice and propose that courts could mediate citizens’ actions regarding political responsibilities.

Keywords

Corporate responsibility, Iris Marion Young, responsibility for justice, social connection model, structural injustice, Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, SDG 13 - Climate Action

Citation

Bziuk, B 2025, 'Can business corporations be legally responsible for structural injustice? The social connection model in (legal) practice', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (CRISPP), vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 550-569. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2120732