A Board of Appeals for Frontex: Panacea for Violations or Another Patch in the Incomplete System of Accountability?

Abstract

The accountability system of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is far from being complete and effective: the recent dismissal of the action for Frontex’s non-contractual liability by the General Court (WS v Frontex) made clear once again that the judicial and administrative mechanisms currently available are ill-suited to effectively review the Agency’s action. Given this lasting failure, this article investigates whether the accountability framework of the Agency could be improved through the establishment of a Board of Appeal (BoA) similar to those established by other European Union (EU) Agencies. In order to explore this hypothesis, the article considers the two primary functions served by BoAs in the EU administrative system and puts them in relation to two key tasks of Frontex: the elaboration of the risk analysis and the return of migrants. The analysis is founded on a critical appraisal of the limitations of the current judicial and administrative remedies in addressing Frontex’s action with regard to the two selected tasks. The article concludes by highlighting that while the establishment of a BoA for Frontex would be legally feasible, its desirability must be accurately assessed considering some critical points.