Exploring the Nexus between European Competition Law and Democratic Society: A Case of Political Microtargeting

Abstract

The nexus between European competition law and democracy has been widely researched. Against the background of the ongoing digital transition and the power of big technology companies, this contribution aims to advance the debate by focusing on a specific example of political microtargeting and its effects on the (digital) public sphere. It explores the potential role of European competition law in ameliorating these emergent harms. The argument is developed by showing that the role of big technology companies in political microtargeting processes extends beyond passive facilitators. By following financial incentives and treating citizens as consumers, these companies, in effect, reduce incommensurable democratic values to fit economic metrics. Although European competition law has traditionally played a limited role in addressing political microtargeting challenges, there may be instances where the special responsibility of powerful private entities should extend to mitigating market-induced harms to democracy.