Silicon law of oligarchy: Patterns of member participation in the decision-making of platform cooperatives.

Publication date

2024-07

Authors

Bunders, DamionORCID 0000-0002-7007-3577ISNI 000000049279832X

Editors

Advisors

Supervisors

Document Type

Article
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License

cc_by

Abstract

Platform cooperatives that are owned and governed by gig workers themselves have been proposed as a silver bullet to improve these workers’ influence on organizational decision-making. However, they remain relatively rare compared with dominant investor-owned platforms. Traditionally, worker cooperatives strive for alternative organizing based on the ideal of workplace democracy but are often faced with unequal participation by members in decision-making processes. To test for participation inequalities, this study used survey data (n ¼ 418) from a network of four platform worker cooperatives in Italy. The results show that members with lower affective commitment towards their cooperative and less social capital among other members are less likely to participate, but that there is no effect of cooperative size and human capital.

Keywords

cooperatives, democracy, employee voice, self-organization, technology

Citation

Bunders, D 2024, 'Silicon law of oligarchy: Patterns of member participation in the decision-making of platform cooperatives.', Socio-Economic Review, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 1335–1354. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad058