Making nonpunitive accountability matter: Exploring behavioral effects of nonpunitive accountability in a conjoint experiment

Abstract

Punitive measures (sanctions) are central to accountability. Their use is however costly as they harm relationships. Prior research shows that punitive measures often remain unused. Public sector actors further operate in informal accountability settings where punitive measures are absent. Additionally, doctrines such as New Public Governance prioritize informal networks above hierarchy and punitive measures. Against this background, we study when and why nonpunitive accountability can be effective. Three theoretical logics are developed for decision-making behavior under the condition of accountability. We theorize account-givers are driven by a combination of extrinsic, intrinsic, and relational motivation. A conjoint experiment is used to study decisions (N = 761) of administrative leaders in Denmark in varying nonpunitive accountability conditions. Our findings suggest that a combination of extrinsic motivation and relational motivation explains decisions of account-givers in nonpunitive settings. The study expands our theoretical knowledge of the behavioral effects of accountability and offers insights for policy practitioners.