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From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

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from_tarski_to_godel.pdf (336.46 KB)

Publication date

2019-09-01

Authors

Visser, AlbertISNI 0000000117485188

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DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exz004

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Article

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Abstract

In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski's Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth.

Keywords

formal theories, consistency, self-reference, truth

Citation

Visser, A 2019, 'From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference', Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 595-604. https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exz004

URI

https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/390239