Conflictual Accountability: Behavioral Responses to Conflictual Accountability of Agencies
Publication date
2021-09-01
Authors
Schillemans, T.
Overman, Sjors
Fawcett, Paul
Flinders, Matthew
Fredriksson, Magnus
Laegreid, Per
Maggetti, Martino
Papadopoulos, Yannis
Rubecksen, Kristin
Rykkja, Lise H.
Editors
Advisors
Supervisors
Document Type
Article
Metadata
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License
cc_by_nc
Abstract
In contemporary public governance, leaders of public organizations are faced with multiple, and oftentimes conflictual, accountability claims. Drawing upon a survey of CEO’s of agencies in seven countries, we explore whether and how conflictual accountability regimes relate to strategic behaviors by agency-CEO’s and their political principals. The presence of conflictual accountability is experienced as a major challenge and is associated with important behavioral responses by those CEO’s. This article demonstrates empirically how conflictual accountability is related to (a) controlling behaviors by principals, (b) constituency building behaviors by agencies, and (c) a general pattern of intensified contacts and information processing by both parties.
Keywords
accountability, agencies, conflictual accountability, governance, Sociology and Political Science, Public Administration, Marketing
Citation
Schillemans, T, Overman, S, Fawcett, P, Flinders, M, Fredriksson, M, Laegreid, P, Maggetti, M, Papadopoulos, Y, Rubecksen, K, Rykkja, L H, Salomonsen, H H, Smullen, A, Verhoest, K & Wood, M 2021, 'Conflictual Accountability : Behavioral Responses to Conflictual Accountability of Agencies', Administration and Society, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 1232-1262. https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997211004606