Institutionalizing the democratic party-state. Political parties as 'public utilities' in Italy and West Germany, 1945-1975

Publication date

2018

Authors

Corduwener, P.ORCID 0009-0001-4954-774XISNI 0000000389289308

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Supervisors

Document Type

Article
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Abstract

This article argues that the rise of parties as ‘public utilities’, that is, semi-state organs crucial in the functioning of democracy, which is currently observed by political scientists, has long historical roots. It looks from an institutionalist perspective to the development of party–state relations in Germany and Italy since the Second World War, paying specific attention to how institutional reform corresponded to changing normative assumptions about the position of political parties in twentieth-century democracy. The first notions on the ‘statist’ dimension of parties were put forward as an answer to the challenges of mass politics in the interwar era. After 1945, politicians and constitutional judges drew upon this tradition in their efforts to stabilize mass democracy. They deliberately constructed ‘party-state democracies’, in which parties influenced the state and the state managed individual parties and the party system. This became visible in the constitutionalization of political parties, as well as in the enactment and normative justification of party (finance) laws in the 1960s and 1970s. The advent of parties as public utilities, even though fiercely criticized today, was therefore embedded in an ideological tradition that sanctioned the ‘party-state’ as crucial for the stability of modern democracy.

Keywords

democracy, political parties, party-state, Germany, Italy, Parteienstaat, partitocrazia, Leibholz, Mortati, cartel-party

Citation

Corduwener, P 2018, 'Institutionalizing the democratic party-state. Political parties as 'public utilities' in Italy and West Germany, 1945-1975', European Review of History/Revue Europeenne d'Histoire, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 101-120. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2017.1301394