Risk aversion and overbidding in first price sealed bid auctions: new experimental evidence

Publication date

2019-01

Authors

Füllbrunn, Sascha
Janssen, Dirk JanISNI 0000000523877398
Weitzel, GustavISNI 0000000391636401

Editors

Advisors

Supervisors

Document Type

Article
Open Access logo

License

taverne

Abstract

Bidding above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets. We find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding. (JEL D44, C91).

Keywords

Taverne, General Business,Management and Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, B Journal

Citation

Füllbrunn, S, Janssen, D J & Weitzel, U 2019, 'Risk aversion and overbidding in first price sealed bid auctions: new experimental evidence', Economic Inquiry, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 631-647. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12716