De-securitising and Re-securitising Gang Policies: The Funes Government and Gangs in El Salvador

Abstract

This article analyses the gang policies of the first years of the Funes administration in El Salvador, from June 2.009 until July 2.012.. Using securitisation theory, it explains why the administration returned to an emphasis on extraordinary measures, most of them repressive, to deal with gangs. It argues that these measures were the product of an ongoing and dynamic process in which the government was but one of the players in a complex field constituted by numerous actors. The return to repressive measures as well as the support and facilitation of a 'gang truce' were not the result of a rational design or a predetermined agenda, but should be seen as a series of moves in a political conjuncture, in which the Salvadorean government needed to communicate to different audiences messages of being in control.