Logical consequence for nominalists
Publication date
2009
Authors
Rossberg, Marcus
Cohnitz, D.
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Document Type
Article
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Abstract
It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine's which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way.
Keywords
Inferentialism, Logical consequence, Nelson Goodman, Nominalism, Philosophy of mathematics, W.V. Quine, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
Citation
Rossberg, M & Cohnitz, D 2009, 'Logical consequence for nominalists', Theoria-Revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 147-168.