The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

Publication date

2018-06

Authors

Spithoven, AntoonISNI 0000000115932562

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Article
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Abstract

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values — that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.

Keywords

collective decision-making, institutional and evolutionary economics, law and economics, SCI and SSCI Journals

Citation

Spithoven, A H G M 2018, 'The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists', Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 550-558. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2018.1469935