Why having one’s rationality openly exploited might be considered manipulation

Abstract

This paper responds to Daniel Dennett’s 2012 Praemium Erasmianum Essay Erasmus: Sometimes a Spin Doctor is Right in which he makes a distinction between manipulation and non-manipulative influence. Dennett argues that influence on an individual’s decision-making process is not manipulative so long as that individual’s rationality is involved. In this work we show that Dennett’s account of this distinction is, at best, incomplete. He fails to consider the many factors that implicitly weigh on a person’s rational decision-making process. That is, there are a number of manipulable factors that will always have some bearing on one’s rationality, ultimately influencing what reasons the individual ends up endorsing. We conclude that in order to make a clear distinction between ‘mere influence’ and manipulation, an appeal to rationality alone is not sufficient.