The Challenge of Multiple Accountability: Does Redundancy Lead to Overload?

Abstract

In the early years of World War II, Friedrich and Finer engaged in a seminal dispute on how to organize responsibilities in modern democratic government (Friedrich 1940; Finer 1941). Their dispute is often referred to as one of the defining moments in the development of the concepts of administrative responsibility and political accountability (Romzek 1996, 97; Dubnick 2005, 1). According to Finer, clear lines of command and control are the basis of any democratic system of ministerial responsibility. He thus proposed what has come to be seen as the conventional approach to accountability: democracy is best served by an unambiguous division between politics and administration and a clear hierarchy, with comprehensive goals and substantial sanctions through which unwanted conduct is punished. Friedrich, on the other hand, claimed that, given the obvious growth in size and complexity of contemporary government, the conventional hierarchical system would not suffice to ensure responsible behavior on the part of government. Simply executing already formulated policies was no longer an option, since important aspects of policy making had shifted from the hands of politicians to administrative agencies (Friedrich 1940, 5). This meant that the conventional, unilateral model of political responsibility and administrative accountability no longer fit the evolving reality of public government. In his view, a firm emphasis on professional norms and a sense of individual administrative responsibility, accompanied by additional accountability mechanisms, were now needed.