Economic Exceptionalism? Justice and the Liberal Conception of Rights
Publication date
2020
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Abstract
Are political and economic rights equally basic? This is one of the main issues liberal egalitarians and classical liberals disagree about. The former think political rights should be more strongly protected than economic ones; classical liberals thus accuse them of an unjustified and politically biased ‘economic exceptionalism’. Recently, John Tomasi has developed a special version of this challenge, which is targeted against Murphy and Nagel’s account of the relationship between property rights and just taxation. In this paper, I analyze this challenge, and provide an account of its limitations. Tomasi’s strategy to drive Murphy and Nagel’s account into an overgeneralization problem brings to light that liberals weren’t guilty of any kind of economic exceptionalism in the first place. However, this also shows that classical liberalism and libertarians do not disagree as much as it might seem.
Keywords
liberalism, libertarianism, justice, economic exceptionalism, JohnTomasi
Citation
Sauer, H C 2020, 'Economic Exceptionalism? Justice and the Liberal Conception of Rights', Moral Philosophy and Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 151–167. https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0047