The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip

Publication date

2024

Authors

Kleiner, Johannes
Ludwig, TimISNI 0000000506808171

Editors

Advisors

Supervisors

Document Type

Article
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License

cc_by

Abstract

We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system’s states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem’s main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.

Keywords

Artificial Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Sentience, Large Language Model, Machine Consciousness, No-Go Theorem, Synthetic Phenomenology, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Clinical Psychology, Neurology, Clinical Neurology, Psychiatry and Mental health, SDG 3 - Good Health and Well-being

Citation

Kleiner, J & Ludwig, T 2024, 'The case for neurons : a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip', Neuroscience of Consciousness, vol. 2024, no. 1, niae037. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae037