Constitutional Asymmetry through an Empirical Lens: A Federal Device for Diverse Systems
Publication date
2024-06-29
Editors
Mathieu, Félix
Guénette, Dave
Gagnon, Alain-G.
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Supervisors
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Part of book
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Abstract
Constitutional asymmetry, as a form of territorial diversity management, is an important federal device for multinational systems. While acknowledging the possible impact on the territorial integrity of the system, this chapter examines how constitutional engineering can mitigate this effect. To this end, the chapter defines federal systems as systems in search of a balance between cohesion and regional autonomy. The notion of constitutional asymmetry is then operationalized to enable an accurate x-ray of singular states, as well as comparative analysis. This way, degrees of autonomy can be assessed for each territorial unit, and constitutional asymmetry can be measured for each system. Such comparative analysis is needed to identify factors that lead to asymmetries and the dynamics involved. The question that guides this chapter is: how effective is constitutional asymmetry as a form of territorial diversity management? Importantly, while constitutional asymmetry is measured in terms of autonomy alone, this chapter holds that the combination with overall cohesion is essential for the system’s effectiveness.
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Citation
Sahadžić, M & Popelier, P 2024, Constitutional Asymmetry through an Empirical Lens : A Federal Device for Diverse Systems. in F Mathieu, D Guénette & A-G Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism : A Pluralist Approach. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp. 45-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51093-9_3