The Capability Approach and Distributive Justice

Abstract

In its most general description, the capability approach is a flexible and multi-purpose normative framework, rather than a precise theory of well-being, freedom, or justice. At its core are two normative claims: first, that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people’s capabilities, that is, their substantive opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value. This framework can be used for a range of evaluative exercises, including (1) the assessment of well-being; (2) the normative assessment of social arrangements; and (3) the design or critique of policies, practices, and social institutions. In all these normative endeavors, the capability approach prioritizes (a selection of) peoples’ beings and doings and their opportunities to realize those beings and doings (such as their genuine opportunities to be educated, and their ability to move around or to enjoy supportive social relationships). This stands in contrast to other accounts of well-being, which focus exclusively on subjective categories (such as happiness or desire-satisfaction) or on the means to achieve well-being, such as resources.