State Ownership in Industrial Policy: Assessing Anticompetitive Risks on Mixed Markets

Abstract

State ownership has re-emerged as a pivotal element in global industrial policy, particularly in the context of strategic autonomy and sustainability transitions. In this paper, I systematically examine the anticompetitive risks associated with the increased presence of State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) in mixed markets. By drawing on industrial organization and competition policy literature, as well as EU enforcement practice, I offer a comprehensive risk assessment of SOEs involved in collusion and abuse of dominance (monopolization). I find that notwithstanding telling examples of cartel enforcement against SOEs, the literature supports that SOEs either form welfare-enhancing cartels, or deter collusion by private firms altogether. At the same time clear patterns from enforcement practice emerge of SOEs with a statutory monopoly abusing their dominance, however, without enough guidance from the literature. More theoretical and empirical research on the incentives and likelihood of abuse of dominance by SOEs is therefore urgently needed.