The Transparent Allocation of Limited Rights: What Types of Transparency Promote Public Interests?
Publication date
2025-04
Editors
Jansen, Chris
van Ommeren, Frank
Wolswinkel, Johan
Arrowsmith, Sue
Advisors
Supervisors
Document Type
Part of book
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taverne
Abstract
This chapter departs from the assumption that, notwithstanding that transparency is an essential element of competitive allocation of limited rights, it is also a diffuse concept. There are many different transparency obligations, and not all obligations have the same effect on the realization of public interests. Based on an overview of the different types of transparency obligations, this chapter explores the relation between the various types of transparency obligations and traditional market goals on the one hand, and transparency obligations and other general interests on the other. The purpose of the analysis is to answer the question of how these transparency obligations should be designed to balance the various interests that are pursued with competitive allocation of limited rights, whenever transparency is concerned.
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Citation
Buijze, A 2025, The Transparent Allocation of Limited Rights: What Types of Transparency Promote Public Interests? in C Jansen, F van Ommeren, J Wolswinkel & S Arrowsmith (eds), Optimizing Public Interests through Competitive Tendering : Concept, Context and Challenges. Cambridge University Press, pp. 357-388. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009443739.013