Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress

Publication date

2024-08

Authors

Rehren, Paul Heinrich PeterORCID 0000-0003-4267-3097ISNI 0000000507301292
Blunden, Charlie ThomasISNI 0000000506334594

Editors

Advisors

Supervisors

Document Type

Article
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License

cc_by

Abstract

An important question about moral progress is what causes it. One of the most popular proposed mechanisms is moral reasoning: moral progress often happens because lots of people reason their way to improved moral beliefs. Authors who defend moral reasoning as a cause of moral progress have relied on two broad lines of argument: the general and the specific line. The general line presents evidence that moral reasoning is in general a powerful mechanism of moral belief change, while the specific line tries to establish that moral reasoning can explain specific historical examples of moral progress. In this paper, we examine these lines in detail, using Kumar and Campbell’s (2022, A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How It Made Us Human. Oxford University Press) model of rational moral progress to sharpen our focus. For each line, we explain the empirical assumptions it makes; we then argue that the available evidence supports none of these assumptions. We conclude that at this point, we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress.

Keywords

causal inference, empirically-informed philosophy, moral progress, moral psychology, moral reasoning, Philosophy

Citation

Rehren, P & Blunden, C 2024, 'Let’s not get ahead of ourselves : we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress', Philosophical Explorations, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2363876