The effect of the accidental disclosure of confidential short sales positions

Publication date

2019-03

Authors

Galema, RientsISNI 0000000388127139
Gerritsen, DirkORCID 0000-0002-9024-4775ISNI 0000000369059820

Editors

Advisors

Supervisors

Document Type

Article
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Abstract

EU regulations mandate that short sellers disclose short positions as of 0.2% to authorities, which publicly disclose positions as of 0.5%. In January 2017, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets accidentally disclosed confidential positions. Using the entire register, we show that small positions forecast future underperformance. We use the accidental disclosure as natural experiment to analyze the effect of publishing this information. Abnormal returns are positive after the disclosure. A possible explanation is that perceived short-selling risk on disclosed positions increased, which reduced the appetite for shorting. This is consistent with a post-event drop in abnormal short sales costs.

Keywords

Short sales, Transparency, Accidental disclosure, Equity lending, ESMA, Taverne, SCI and SSCI Journals

Citation

Galema, R J & Gerritsen, D F 2019, 'The effect of the accidental disclosure of confidential short sales positions', Finance Research Letters, vol. 28, pp. 87-94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2018.04.004