Plotinus on Perceptual Recognition

Abstract

Plotinus on Perceptual Recognition – Summary This dissertation offers a systematic reconstruction of Plotinus’ theories of sense perception and perceptual recognition. Sense perception is understood as the broader term referring to the soul’s judgment based on the sensory affection of the sense organ, while perceptual recognition more specifically denotes the identification of a perceptible object as a distinct entity. Welslau suggests that the latter forms an integral part of the process of sense perception. She addresses the central question of how Plotinus accounts for our ability to recognise sensible objects as specific entities. The dissertation is divided into two parts, each offering a distinct approach to this question. Part I explores key aspects of Plotinus’ theory of sense perception—such as the relationship between body and soul, the nature of the perceptible object, sensory affection, and perceptual activity. Part II examines perceptual recognition and the nature of the standards that enable the soul to recognise a sensible object as a specific entity. According to Plotinus, sense perception involves a judgment by the soul on a sensory affection of the sense organ. This affection entails a phenomenal awareness of the qualities of a perceptible object currently affecting the organ. It does not primarily involve direct physical contact but rather a co-affection or sympathetic relationship between the perceptible object and the sense organ—both of which are unified through their participation in the world soul, whose lowest phase, nature, generates the natural world. To recognise the perceptible object as a specific entity, the soul must draw upon certain standards. Welslau argues that perceptual recognition largely depends on standards that are innate to the soul. She distinguishes between formal standards and content standards. Formal standards regard the form or structure of an act of perceptual recognition and correspond to the primary constituents of the soul. Content standards enable the soul to recognise the specific identity of a perceptible object. A natural sensible object is a distinct entity by virtue of being created by the world soul in accordance with a logos it derives through contemplation of the Forms in Intellect. Consequently, the identity of a sensible object can be recognised by drawing on its corresponding logos. The logoi of all natural things are innate to each individual soul. Accordingly, Welslau argues that when recognising a natural sensible object, the content standard is the innate logos that corresponds to the perceived object. The account differs in the case of the recognition of artefacts. While the principles of types of artefacts are innate to the soul, the principles of individual artefacts are creative inventions of the artist and therefore cannot be innate. Consequently, the standards by which the soul recognises the identity of an individual artefact must be acquired empirically.