Under Watchful Eyes : Experimental Studies on Accountability and Decision-Making Behavior in the Public Sector

Abstract

A myriad of effects have been attributed to the operation of accountability mechanisms in the public sector. From preventing the abuse of power to improving the effectiveness of public service provision. Many of these suggest causal chains in which accountability mechanisms are expected to stimulate specific behaviors by individuals leading to desirable outcomes in the public domain. Yet, many of these links have been assumed rather than established. This dissertation aims to develop a better understanding of the behavioral consequences of accountability mechanisms in the public sector. It does so by surveying the experimental behavioral literature on accountability, as well as through three experimental studies. These three experiments offer insights on the importance of specifying the accountability standard for public sector decision-making, the prioritization of account-holders in responding to accountability demands, as well as on the coping of public sector professionals with multiple accountabilities. These insights will help decision-makers in government and elsewhere to make evidence-based decisions to calibrate and improve existing accountability mechanisms.